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Abstract
As part of their core mission, public health agencies attend to a wide range of disease and health threats, including those
that require routine, acute, and emergency responses. While each incident is unique, the number and type of response
activities are finite; therefore, through comparative analysis, we can learn about commonalities in the response patterns that
could improve predictions and expectations regarding the resources and capabilities required to respond to future acute
events. In this study, we interviewed representatives from more than 120 local health departments regarding their recent
experiences with real-world acute public health incidents, such as infectious disease outbreaks, severe weather events,
chemical spills, and bioterrorism threats. We collected highly structured data on key aspects of the incident and the public
health response, particularly focusing on the public health activities initiated and community partners engaged in the
response efforts. As a result, we are able to make comparisons across event types, create response profiles, and identify
functional and structural response patterns that have import for future public health preparedness and response. Our study
contributes to clarifying the complexity of public health response systems and our analysis reveals the ways in which these
systems are adaptive to the character of the threat, resulting in differential activation of functions and partners based on the
type of incident. Continued and rigorous examination of the experiences of health departments throughout the nation will
refine our very understanding of what the public health response system is, will enable the identification of organizational
and event inputs to performance, and will allow for the construction of rich, relevant, and practical models of response
operations that can be employed to strengthen public health systems.
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Introduction
As part of their core mission, public health agencies attend to a
wide range of disease and health threats, including those that
require routine, acute, and emergency responses. In recent years,
the 2001 anthrax attacks, the emergence of Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), the extraordinary destruction
caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and the pandemic
from the novel H1N1 influenza virus have provided vivid
examples of how natural and man-made phenomena can wreak
havoc on the health and well-being of a community. Public health
agencies have received increased attention and visibility following
these events, which have been met with public investments in
preparedness, as well as heightened expectations of the public
health system’s ability to prevent, detect, and contain health
threats to communities [1,2].
As expectations have expanded, the need to strengthen public
health systems’ capacity and capabilities to respond to any hazard
has been at the center of many policy discussions [1,2]. However,
the evidence base for how to achieve this priority has lagged
behind. There is still little agreement on how to measure, let alone
improve, public health response performance [3,4]. A number of
challenges have been cited as barriers to research advancement in
this field, including: the infrequent nature of large-scale public
health emergencies [3,5–7], the heterogeneity of emergency events
and of public health delivery structures [3,6], the challenges with
access to incident leadership during real-world emergencies [7],
the limited ability for standardized surveys to measure complex
agency and system processes [6], and the difficulty of identifying a
comparison group or constructing a counterfactual of what might
have occurred if particular public health interventions had not
taken place [8,9]. As a result, outside of statistical modeling,
researchers have often been limited in their use of statistical
methods to test hypotheses, reach generalizable conclusions, and
isolate factors that are likely to have the greatest impact on
response capacity [8,10]. Additionally, because catastrophic events
are infrequent, the majority of the measurement literature in this
field has focused on preparedness rather than on response -- on
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identifying and measuring the inputs to preparedness rather than
the variations in response performance. What is known about
public health emergency response is largely derived from
simulated emergencies (e.g. exercises or drills), with a primary
focus on bioterrorism or pandemic influenza [3]. By relying on an
evidence base that draws from a narrow set of threats, we run the
risk of overemphasizing the capabilities and resources required for
those incidents while neglecting those that may be essential in
other scenarios [11]. Furthermore, simulated emergencies intro-
duce artificialities that do not reflect real-world response situations
[12].
This study attempts to overcome these limitations and to inform
agency preparation and performance by implementing a novel
approach. First, we concentrate on characterizing responses to
real-world events rather than preparedness and response efforts for
hypothetical scenarios. Second, we broaden the case material to
include acute public health events, not just disasters. And third, we
compare response features across incidents rather than identifying
lessons learned from single isolated incidents. The methodological
basis for this approach is that while each event is unique, the
number and type of response activities are finite; therefore,
through comparative analysis, we can learn about commonalities
in the response patterns that could improve understanding of the
resources and capabilities required to respond to future acute
events.
The purpose of this study was twofold: (1) to test this novel
approach, and (2) to describe public health agency response
patterns to a diversity of acute events. For this study, we collected
highly-structured data on more than 120 real-world acute
incidents, representing the broadest examination of events that
have stressed the local public health system in the United States.
By pooling data across diverse incident contexts and types, we
increase the number of opportunities for learning [13–15]. This
study serves as a starting point for the development of evidence-
based forecasts of public health system response behavior that will
help shape researchers’ and practitioners’ expectations for public
health activity during urgent events and identify situations in
which a governmental public health response has deviated from
these expectations. Such deviations or ‘‘surprises’’ can provide
opportunities to improve and update our understanding of
response performance by pointing either to a lack of sophistication
in our predictive models, adaptive response behaviors or
promising practices that could be applied in other situations to
beneficial effect, or unnecessary variation associated with ineffi-
ciencies that may affect the health of a community or the
reputation of public health agencies.
Adopting the maxim that ‘‘all emergencies are local,’’ we
focused this research on describing the public health response
systems from the perspective of the local health department. We
examine three domains through structured interviews with public
health authorities involved in response efforts, including: (1) key
characteristics of the acute event context, (2) the number and type
of public response activities initiated using the CDC Public Health
Preparedness (PHEP) Capabilities as an organizing framework,
and (3) the number and type of organizations contributing to the
public health response activities. The domains selected for this
investigation were informed by a study of the organization and
delivery of local public health services during normal operations
by Mays et al. (2009), which employed similar measures in the
expectation that they could reasonably be expected to influence
performance and outcomes [16,17]. We view these response
measures as intermediate outcomes between an exposure (i.e. the




This research uses a mixed-methods approach. Quantitative
and qualitative data on urgent event and response characteristics
were collected through structured telephone-based interviews with
health department representatives using a retrospective cross-
sectional design.
Study population
Selection criteria and sampling design. The National
Association of City and County Health Officials’ (NACCHO)
2010 National Profile of Local Health Departments (Profile of
LHDs) was used to identify a sampling frame of 856 local health
departments that serve a population of at least 50,000 individuals
[18]. A total of 354 local health departments were recruited for
participation, including: (a) all 171 local health departments that
had responded to a Profile of LHD survey question indicating that
their agency had responded to an ‘‘all-hazards emergency’’
between January 2009 and late 2010; (b) a random sample of
169 local health departments from the remaining sampling frame,
using a probability-proportional-to-size sampling strategy; and (c)
a convenience sample of 14 local health departments included in
the pilot phase, with whom the researchers either had a personal
connection or had learned about their involvement in incidents
through an online disease outbreak alerting system, HealthMa-
p.org [19].
To be eligible for participation, recruited health departments
had to self-report that their agency had responded to an ‘‘urgent’’
event in recent history, defined as an event ‘‘whose scale, timing,
or unpredictability overwhelmed or threatened to overwhelm
routine capacity’’ [20]. Simulated emergencies and events related
to the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic were excluded. Addition-
ally, the representative(s) volunteering to participate in an
interview had to indicate that they were generally knowledgeable
about the overall public health response to the selected event.
Recruitment. Study recruitment and data collection proceed-
ed in rounds, starting in March 2012 and ending in October 2012.
In the initial rounds of recruitment, study invitations were emailed
to preparedness coordinators and health officers for selected
LHDs. Through follow-up phone calls with these health depart-
ment representatives, we learned that personnel in different
functional roles, specifically communicable disease control staff or
epidemiologists, would be the best informed about the overall
response to an infectious disease event. As a result, after
approximately one-quarter of our sample had been recruited, we
shifted our outreach strategy and targeted either (1) the
preparedness coordinator, or (2) the communicable disease
director or epidemiologist, in an effort to identify a range of
infectious and non-infectious disease events. Each round of
recruitment lasted six weeks, during which, individuals were sent
the initial email invitation and study description, a reminder
postcard by mail, three email reminders, and a telephone or
voicemail follow-up. Individuals were also informed that they
could forward the invitation to another person within the health
department who might be better positioned to participate, and
that multiple people could participate in a single interview.
As an incentive for participation, all participants were offered a
customized report that would summarize their interview and
provide a comparison to other de-identified health department(s)
that had participated and discussed a similar event. Participants
were also entered into a raffle for the chance to receive monetary
prizes in the form of public health preparedness books.
Local Public Health Systems and Urgent Events
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Measurements and Instrument
Instrument. Interviews were conducted by phone using a
structured interview tool, which included questions related to the
three primary research domains, including: (1) key characteristics
of the acute event context, (2) the number and type of public
response activities initiated using the CDC Public Health
Preparedness (PHEP) Capabilities as an organizing framework,
and (3) the number and type of organizations contributing to the
public health response activities. The questions and response
options were iteratively developed and refined through testing with
over 100 case studies reported in the peer-reviewed literature and
further revised after pilot-testing with four local health depart-
ments.
Three interviewers (two primary and one backup) were
extensively trained on the intent of each question in the
instrument, administration protocols, and response coding. Any
questions regarding the interpretation and coding of interview
responses were discussed throughout the data collection period.
After all of the interviews had been completed, each of the two
primary interviewers reviewed the others’ completed data
collection tools to ensure that coding decisions were consistently
applied.
Measures. Event characteristics. Each event was character-
ized with respect to a number of contextual features, which were
selected with the goal of building a common operational picture
that could allow for meaningful comparison across disparate
incidents. We hypothesized that public health systems are adaptive
to the nature of the event and therefore would expect to observe
differential activation (in both number and type) of the response
functions and partners based on the type of incident. In contrast, a
non-adaptive response system would engage similar functions and
partners regardless of incident type. Accordingly, our predictor
variable was the type of event. Each incident was assigned to one
of six specific event type categories, as defined by the CDC
Emergency Preparedness and Response website, including:
infectious disease outbreaks and incidents, natural disaster or severe weather
events, bioterrorism events, mass casualty events, chemical emergency events, or
radiation emergency events [21]. For the purposes of conducting certain
analyses within this investigation, these categories were further
collapsed into two groups: infectious disease events, including
bioterrorism and infectious disease outbreak events, and non-
infectious disease events, comprising the remaining event types.
For all events, regardless of type, the following event details
were summarized: the duration of the public health response, the
number of individuals directly contacted to investigate illness or
exposure, the number of probable or confirmed cases, the number
of severe cases (requiring hospitalization or resulting in death), and
the number of persons receiving medical countermeasures as part
of the public health response. Additionally, for each event, we
recorded additional information data related to the scope of the
event, such as the geographic locations affected, types of
populations and community services affected by the event, and
how frequently the health department responds to a similar event
on the same scale as the one they selected for the interview.
Public health response activities. We used the CDC
Public Health Preparedness Capabilities (PHEP Capabilities)
framework and definitions as the basis for characterizing the
public health activities carried out in response to the hazard [22].
The response activities are the first of our two primary outcome
variables. The Capabilities framework identifies and defines 15
types of services that public health systems might be expected to
deliver during emergencies. We deviated from this framework for
the purpose of data collection in three key ways. First, we added
four categories that emerged as important public health response
activities through previous related work and pilot-testing but that
are not emphasized in the PHEP Capabilities document. These
categories included: environmental investigations, evacuation,
consulting subject matter experts, and assessing medical and
public health response capacity. Second, we eliminated the
‘‘preparedness’’ category from the list of public health response
activities included in the interview since pilot-testing proved it was
a confusing concept in the context of a specific response effort.
Finally, we collected ‘‘other’’ activities that participants felt were
important aspects of the response that had not otherwise been
captured in the interview. Interviewers described each of the 19
response activity categories (14 original PHEP Capabilities, four
additional categories, and an ‘‘other public health response
activity’’ category) and asked participants to indicate whether
any related activities were initiated during the response to their
selected event. Additionally, participants were asked to identify
which of the response activities were ‘‘absolutely necessary to the
overall response.’’ A summary score was calculated by summing
the total number of public health response activities initiated
during an event (between 0 and 19 activities).
Role of public health in the overall response. In order to
characterize the role of public health agencies in the event
response, participants were asked to specify whether public health
served in the lead role, joint-lead role with another responding
agency, or supporting role.
Organizational response partners. The second outcome
of interest is the public health response system, which we define as
all entities who contributed to public health response activities for
a given event. For each of the public health activities initiated
during a response, participants were asked to identify the
organizations and agencies that contributed to that activity,
including their own organization. A list of 41 organization types
was developed once all interviews were completed based on
participants’ qualitative responses. The categorization of organi-
zations was based on the descriptions of the public health system in
the literature and expert opinion, using organizational function as
the basis for classification [16,23–25]. Three measures were
developed from these data. The first measure, ‘‘any involvement’’,
is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether entities from each
of the 41 organizational categories contributed to any of the 19
public health response activities. The second measure, ‘‘relative
contribution’’, is a weighted measure that summarizes, for each
event, the number of response activities for which an organization
type contributed, compared to the total number of response
activities performed during that event. Therefore, for each event in
which a specific organization type had any involvement, the
‘‘Relative Involvement’’ for an organization type was calculated
as:
Relative contribution (organization) ~
Number of activities contributed by organization
Total number of activities performed during event
Additionally, a summary measure of the total number of
organizational categories mentioned in the interviews was
calculated (between 0 and 41 organizations).
Alternate explanatory variables. Because we expected that
factors such as community context and local health department
capacity also influenced the character of the public health response
system, we also conducted an exploratory analysis to assess this
relationship [16,17]. Using data from the 2010 National Profile of
Local Public Health Systems and Urgent Events
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 November 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 11 | e79457
LHDs, we assessed whether the number of response activities and
partners varies by key characteristics of the health department,
including: the population size served by a health department,
health department expenditures, and number of full-time equiv-
alent (FTE) staff [18]. Additionally, we examined whether the
response activities and response partners vary based on the nexus
of public health authority, which can be at the state or the local
level.
Statistical issues
Data recorded on paper-based interview tools were entered
electronically into the web-based program, Qualtrics, using double
data entry; the data were managed and analyzed using Stata 12
(StataCorp LP, College Station, TX) and merged with organiza-
tional data from the Profile of LHDs [18]. Distributions of event
characteristics, response activities, and response partners were
calculated and event-specific profiles were developed. For event
and response measures, the differences between infectious disease
and non-infectious disease events were assessed using t tests or chi-
square tests, as appropriate, log-transforming data as necessary. A
multiple linear regression model was employed to assess the
association between organizational factors and response outcomes.
Based on our power analyses and primary research question, we
decided to recruit at least 120 health departments. With this
sample size, we expected to have power of 80 percent to detect
significant differences of 25 percentage points or more between
infectious disease and non-infectious disease events for the
outcome response measures of interest.
Ethics Statement
The protocols for this study were reviewed and approved by the
Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at the University
of California, Berkeley, which determined that our research
activities qualified for exempt status. Participants’ provided verbal
informed consent to participate and to have the research interview
audiorecorded, which was documented in the written record by
the interviewer. This consent process is consistent with our
Institutional Review Board’s requirements for research with
exempt status and with our approved research protocols. At this
time, interview data are not available in a public repository.
Results
Sample demographics
Of the 354 recruited local health departments, participants from
123 health departments completed an interview, resulting in a
35% response rate. The 231 non-participating local health
departments included agencies that: were not eligible because
they did not have an urgent event that met study criteria (9% of
non-participants), enrolled in the study but were lost to follow-up
during the course of data collection (9%), declined to participate
(12%), and provided no response to study recruitment requests
(71%) (see Figure 1).
Participants represented health departments in 38 of the 48 US
states targeted for recruitment, with a diversity of community and
public health agency characteristics (see Figure 2 and Table 1).
These agencies served populations from 50,000 to several million
residents, reported annual expenditures ranging from $1 to more
than $500 per capita, and had staffing levels between 10 and more
than 1,000 Full-Time Equivalents. Nearly three-quarters of
participants represented health agencies that operate as units
decentralized from state health agencies (i.e. locally governed),
with responsibility for a geographic jurisdiction defined by county
boundaries. Overall, compared to non-participants, participating
agencies were significantly more likely to serve a larger population,
have more expenditure per capita, and have more FTEs (for all
values, p,0.05).
Informant and interview characteristics
Interviews involved between 1 and 5 health department staff,
such as preparedness and response coordinators or directors (63%
of interviews), communicable disease staff, including directors,
epidemiologists, and nurses (38% of interviews), health officers or
directors (16%), and environmental health staff (10%) (see Table
1).
Interviews lasted nearly one hour, ranging from 27 minutes to
120 minutes. On average, interviews focusing on infectious disease
events were significantly shorter than those focusing on non-
infectious disease events (p,0.05).
Event Characteristics
Event details. The types of events included in our study
primarily involved infectious disease investigations and severe
weather or natural disasters, with each constituting approximately
40 percent of the total. Our event set also includes incidents
involving chemical exposures, misuse of prescription or illegal
drugs, suspected or confirmed exposure to biological agents,
radiation, mass casualties, technological emergencies (such as
water or power outages), complex events (involving multiple
causes), and anticipated mass-gatherings. Details on the types and
frequencies of events are provided in Table 2.
When informants were asked how frequently their health
department responds to a similar event on the same scale as the
incident they selected for the interview, more than half indicated
that this was the only event of its kind in recent history (29% of
events) or that something similar happens once every few years
(29%). Other events occurred with a greater frequency, from one
to two times per year (28%) to three or more times per year (13%).
Other context and indicators of event severity. The
characteristics of the events included in our study vary widely (see
Table 3). For example, the shortest response duration was
approximately five hours, in the event of a white powder incident,
while the longest response lasted multiple years in the event of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The number of individuals within the
community contacted by health departments and their partners to
assess illness or exposure ranged from 0 to 11,000 individuals,
resulting in the identification of a mean of 37 confirmed or
probable cases per event. Overall, a mean of three cases resulted in
hospitalization or death. A t-test comparison of the log-
transformed variables, duration of response and number of probable or
confirmed cases, revealed that infectious disease events involved
significantly more cases (p,0.05) than did non-infectious disease
events.
All severe weather and natural disaster events directly or
indirectly resulted in the disruption of community infrastructure or
services, including water, sewage, electricity, telecommunications,
roads or transportation, as well as the direct delivery of public
health and medical services. On average, four types of services
were disrupted in these severe weather events. With the exception
of technological emergencies, other types of events rarely involved
an interruption of community services other than those provided
directly by public health, which were postponed or cancelled due
to staff diversions for response activities in nearly a quarter of these
events.
Public Health Response Activities
In response to the urgent events included in our study, the
number and type of public health activities initiated by response
Local Public Health Systems and Urgent Events
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systems varied considerably (Figure 3). Of the 19 activity
categories, urgent event response efforts involved between 3 and
18 types of activities, with a mean of ten activities per event. The
response activities most commonly initiated were those related to:
information sharing and management (100% of events), public
health surveillance and epidemiology (98%), emergency public
information and warning (89%), non-pharmaceutical interventions
(88%), environmental or product investigation (82%), consulting
subject matter experts (79%), public health laboratory testing
(74%), and emergency operations management (65%).
Activity profiles for each of the six event categories (Figure 3)
provide a summary of the frequency and distribution of response
measures by event type. Response efforts for non-infectious disease
events included a significantly greater number of response
activities than infectious disease events, with a mean of 13
compared with 9 response activities, respectively. Only one type of
activity, dispensing medical countermeasures, including vaccina-
tion and post-exposure prophylaxis, was more likely to occur
during infectious disease events (p,0.05). In contrast, 11 different
types of activities were significantly more common in non-
infectious disease events, as shown in Figure 3 with asterisks,
(p,0.05). Because severe weather and natural disaster events
constituted a majority of the non-infectious disease events, we
conducted a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of the
results. After excluding severe weather and natural disaster events,
we found that infectious disease and non-infectious disease events
did not differ significantly with respect to the number of response
activities, and that the only differences in type of activity that
persisted were: dispensing of medical countermeasures, which was
still more common in infectious disease events; emergency
operations management, volunteer management, and mass care
and sheltering remained more common in the non-infectious
disease events (p,0.05). Additionally, after excluding severe
weather and natural disaster events, two new activities appeared
to be more common to infectious disease events, including
epidemiology/surveillance and laboratory testing (p,0.05).
Participants identified ‘‘other’’ public health activities that were
carried out in the response to their event but were not captured by
our pre-defined activity categories, including those related to:
restoring community confidence after an event (e.g. community
meetings, counseling individuals), enabling individuals to follow
disease prevention and health promotion activities (e.g. obtaining
food stamps after food disposal orders, providing financial
assistance if ill or infected persons were excluded from work due
to risk of disease transmission, providing housing for individuals
removed from their homes), contributing to resource coordinating
centers to help affected persons access needed health services and
permits (e.g., food permits) from multiple agencies after an event,
and assessing legal compliance and breaches of protocols.
Essential Response Activities. Our measure of essential
response activities, shown as horizontal gray bars in Figure 3,
provides a summary of activities that were perceived as ‘‘absolutely
Figure 1. Recruitment Flow Diagram. This flow diagram summarizes the sampling and recruitment steps that resulted in the study population of
123 local health departments. Reasons for non-participation are provided, where possible.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079457.g001
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necessary’’ to the overall response. For the urgent events in our
study, activities most commonly reported to be essential were:
epidemiology and surveillance for infectious disease events;
environmental health and mass care and sheltering for severe
weather events; environmental investigations and information
management for chemical events; information management for
events involving biological agents; public information and
warning for radiation events, and ‘‘other’’ for mass casualty
events, including patient transport and coordinating family
assistance centers.
Public Health Response System
Of the urgent events included in our study, we found that public
health response systems were comprised of 3 to 25 types of
organizations, with a mean of 10 organizations (Figure 4). The
types of organizations mentioned as contributors in more than half
of the urgent event responses in our study included: local public
health agencies, including environmental health (98% of events);
state public health agencies (92%); healthcare providers (78%);
members of the general public, including cases, contacts and
family members of cases, and other individuals (70%); first
responders, including emergency medical services, hazardous
materials, and fire (58%); and law enforcement and public safety
agencies (56%).
Overall, infectious and non-infectious disease events differed
with respect to the numbers and types of public health system
partners. The response systems for non-infectious disease events
were comprised of significantly greater numbers of organization
categories, with a mean of 13 versus 7 organization types
respectively (p,0.05). We identified three organization types that
were significantly more common in infectious disease events and
17 organization types that were more common in non-infectious
disease events, shown in Figure 4 (legend). Because the non-
infectious disease category is dominated by severe weather and
natural disaster events, we also conducted a sensitivity analysis to
assess the robustness of our findings after excluding this type of
event. We found that the difference in the number of response
partners between infectious disease and non-infectious disease
events remained significant after excluding severe weather events
(p,0.05). However, only half of the previously observed differ-
ences in the types of response partners remained, including:
general public, first responders, law enforcement, emergency
management, American Red Cross, critical infrastructure, and
laboratories (p,0.05). Additionally, after excluding severe weather
and natural disaster events, two new differences in response
partners appeared: involvement of ports of entry entities were
more common in non-infectious disease events and involvement of
state public health was common in infectious disease events
(p,0.05).
For each incident, we also calculated the relative contribution or the
proportion of initiated response activities to which a participating
agency contributed. The vast majority of partner organizations
contributed to a very limited proportion of the overall response
activities. For example, volunteer organizations were primarily
involved in mass care and sheltering or volunteer management
activities, whereas the involvement of environmental or agricul-
tural entities was mostly limited to environmental investigation
and information sharing. Of forty-one organization types, only five
contributed to more than ten percent of the response activities
initiated during a response, including: local public health agencies,
which contributed to a mean of 79 percent of response activities,
state public health agencies (38% of response activities), healthcare
providers (21%), first responders (14%), emergency management
agencies (13%), and law enforcement agencies (11%).
Role of public health in the response system. Informants
felt that public health played a ‘‘lead role in the overall response’’
to half of the events in this study, a joint-role in approximately
one-third of events, and a supporting role in the remaining events.
Figure 2. Geographic distribution of participating agencies, by U.S. state. This map shows the distribution of participating agencies across
the United States. States with a greater number of participating local health departments (LHDs) are shaded a darker blue. States with the greatest
number of participating health departments included California (12 LHDs), Ohio (8 LHDs), North Carolina (8 LHDs), Texas (7 LHDs), Florida (7 LHDs),
and New Jersey (7 LHDs). Image developed using data from the National Weather Service and the SPMAP module for STATA 12 (College Station, TX:
StataCorp LP) [33,34].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079457.g002
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Table 2. List of events.
Event Type # of Events Event detail (# of events)
Infectious disease event 51 Norovirus (9), Pertussis (7), Salmonellosis (6), Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) (4), Tuberculosis (3),
Hepatitis A (2), Measles (2), Meningococcal disease (2), Mumps (2), Bacillus cereus (1), Botulism (1),
Campylobacteriosis and Guillian Barre Syndrome (1), Coliform bacteria (1), Cryptosporidiosis (1), Cyclosporiasis
(1), Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (1), Legionellosis (1), Lyme disease (1), Novel influenza A virus infections (1),
Rabies-Animal (1), Shigellosis (1), Unknown Etiologic Agent (1), Varicella (Chicken pox) (1)
Severe weather/Natural
disaster
45 Hurricane/Tropical Storm (16), Severe winter weather (7), Tornado (7), Flooding (5), Fire (5), Severe rain or wind
storm/derecho (5)
Chemical or drug event 10 Designer drugs (Bath Salts/White Rush, Blueberry Spice) (2), Hydrogen Sulfide, Natural Gas, Mercaptans (1),
Diesel Fuel And Lubricating Oil (1), Hydrogen Sulfide/Methane Gas (1), Pulverized Limestone (1), Deepwater
Horizon - Crude Oil, tarballs (1), Isocyanate (1), Liquid Mercury (1), Lead, Arsenic (1)
Event involving a biological
agent (suspected or
confirmed)
6 White Powder Incident (Anthrax Suspected, Ruled Out) (3), Anthrax (Confirmed, From Natural Source) (1),
Biowatch Actionable Result (Agent Not Named, Confidential) (1), Ricin (1)
Radiation event 4 Iodine-131, Cesium-134, Cesium-137 (3), Strontium-82 And Strontium-85 (1)
Mass casualty event 2 Explosion (1), Plane crash (1)
Technological emergency 2 Mechanical failure at water treatment plant (1), Transformer fire (1)
Anticipated event 2 Planned mass gathering (1), Displaced persons from natural disaster/severe weather (1)
Complex event 1 Displaced persons from natural disaster/severe weather & infectious disease outbreak (cholera) (1)
Total 123
This table summarizes the total number of events within each event type. The number of events for each sub-category (e.g. number of urgent events involving the
disease pertussis) is shown in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079457.t002
Table 1. Characteristics of Participating Local Health Departments and Participants.
Continuous Variables mean median min max Signif National mean1
Population size (in thousands), n = 123 542 297 51 .2,000 * 294
Expenditures per capita (in U.S. dollars), n = 111 78 43 ,10 .200 * 52
Number of Full Time Equivalent staff (FTE), n = 113 333 122 10 .1000 * 149
Categorical Variables n % of Participants % of LHDs Nationwide1
Governing authority
Centralized authority at the state 18 15 19
Decentralized, authority at the local level 84 69 71
Shared or mixed 19 16 10
Geographic area served by agency
City 14 12 10
City-county 2 2 0
County 85 70 69
Multi-city 3 2 5
Multi-county 17 14 16
Types of Services directly provided by agency
Comprehensive primary care services 20 17 18
Any environmental health services 105 85 90
Position or title of participant(s)2
Preparedness and Response 78 63
CD Staff/Epidemiologist 47 38
Environmental Health 12 10
Health Director/Deputy 12 10
Health Officer/Deputy 7 6
Other 28 23
Table 1 provides a descriptive summary of participants, including characteristics of the public health agency and agency representatives.
1For local health departments serving a population of 50,000 individuals or more.
2Participants could identify more than one position or title.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079457.t001
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However, the public health role varied tremendously by the type
of event, whereby public health was considered to play the lead
role in 100% of the radiation and complex emergency events, 94%
of infectious disease events, 33% of incidents involving a
bioterrorism agent, 30% of chemical events, 9% of severe weather
or natural disaster events, and none of the technological
emergencies or anticipated events.
Community and Public Health Agency Characteristics
Participants from health departments in which governmental
authority is centralized at the state level, or where authority is
shared between state and local entities, were significantly more
likely to choose non-infectious disease events as the subject for the
interview, compared to health departments that are decentralized
from the state health department (p,0.05).
To assess the effect of agency characteristics on the response
structure and function, multiple linear regression models were
used to assess the relationship between the community and agency
measures (predictor variables: size of the population served by a
LHD, number of FTEs, and annual per capita expenditures) and
response measures (outcome variables: number of organizations
involved in the public health system response, number of response
activities initiated during the response) controlling for the type of
event (infectious disease versus non-infectious disease). Each of the
six models included a single predictor and outcome variable,
controlling for the type of event. We used the natural logarithm of
each predictor variable and employed robust standard errors in
the statistical models to minimize the effects of outliers and
heteroskedasticity. Controlling for the type of event, only the
models including the number of full time staff were significantly
correlated with the number of response activities (F = 37.88,
p = 0.005) and the number of partners (F = 57.88, 0.016), both
showing a negative association. This correlation indicates an
inverse correlation between the number of public health depart-
ment staff and the number of organizations and the number of
different types of activities activated during an event.
Response reporting and dissemination
Eighty percent of participants indicated that their health
department developed a report describing their response efforts.
Approximately two-thirds of these health departments developed
after-action reports, which were disseminated internally (66% of
AARs), to contributing agencies (46%), or to the state health
department (37%). In only 11 instances was a summary report
widely disseminated, either in the peer-reviewed literature (4% of
all events), in the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (3%), or
through the Department of Homeland Security Lessons Learned
and Information Sharing web portal (LLIS, 2%).
Discussion
This is the first study to systematically describe and analytically
compare the response operations of local health departments and
their community partners among such a large range of acute
incidents. Public health representatives described their experiences
responding to more than 120 incidents involving unusual clusters
of illness, unexpected exposures to hazardous substances, or the
sudden loss of infrastructure. Regardless of the character of the
event, nearly every informant portrayed a situation that compelled
his or her public health agency to work with a network of other
organizations to take rapid action in an effort to mitigate, control,
or prevent expected adverse health consequences, often in highly
stressful and politically charged environments with demanding
expectations for performance.
Typically, these local public health agencies are faced with
restricted opportunities for learning from real-world urgent events.
One reason is the infrequency with which these events occur for
any given community. More than half of the health departments
that we surveyed described an event that happens once every few
years or an event that was the only one of its kind in recent history.
A second reason is a lack of access to others’ experiences. Our
findings show that less than ten percent of urgent public health
incidents were summarized and disseminated to the outside world,
likely due to a range of factors including time constraints and
concerns over legal or political repercussions. Moreover, when
incident summaries are actually shared, reports are so varied in
structure and level of completeness that making comparisons
across events and drawing parallels to one’s own experiences is
very challenging [13]. Opportunities for learning from events
faced by other health departments are further constrained by
budget cuts, travel restrictions, and a funding environment that
makes it difficult to justify activities that do not meet specific grant
requirements [26]. As a consequence, for many types of events,
health departments are limited in their own direct experiences and
have almost no access to descriptions of the experiences of others.
This environment stands in stark contrast to other organizations
that are expected to perform reliably in high stress environments,
such Naval aircraft carriers, where extensive field experience
results in finely tuned expectations for behavior, or air traffic
control systems, where the study and dissemination of lessons
learned from near-miss incidents serves as a cornerstone for
learning and improvement [27,28]. Above all, this research
Table 3. Event Characteristics.
Event Characteristics # of events mean sd min median max Signif.
Duration of response (in days) (123) 64 125 0.2 18 854 **
Number of individuals contacted to
investigated illness or exposure
(96) 756 2,111 0 80 11,000
Number of probable or confirmed cases (90) 37 82 0 7 565 *
Number of severe cases (number of
hospitalizations or deaths)
(106) 3 7 0 0 51
Number of individuals who received prophylaxis (27) 1,253 2,376 0 161 10,240
This table summarizes key event characteristics, including: duration of response time, number of individuals contacted to investigate illness or injury, number of
probable or confirmed cases, number of severe cases, and number of individuals who received prophylaxis.
*Differences between infectious disease and non-infectious disease events significant at p , 0.05.
**Differences between infectious disease (excluding events involving a bioterrorism agent) and non-infectious disease events significant at p , 0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079457.t003
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Figure 3. Response activity profiles, by event type. This figure shows the profile of response activities for each of six different types of events,
displayed as separate bar charts. For a given event type, the blue vertical bars show the proportion of events that involved each of the 19 defined
response activities. The horizontal gray bars provide the percent of events for which that activity was perceived to be ‘‘essential.’’ For example, within
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demonstrates that it is possible to identify meaningful insights from
a large set of real world events – insights that might not be evident
from an examination of single isolated incidents – and that these
lessons may have relevance in other public health settings and
contexts.
Complexity of public health response system
Our study contributes to clarifying the complexity of the public
health response system, extending and expanding upon current
system models [16,23–25,29]. First, our results demonstrate that
public health response systems are adaptive to the nature of the
threat. Our study response profiles reveal differential activation -
in both number and type - of functions and partners based on the
type of incident. For example, we found that the public health
response to severe weather events involved a much larger and
more diverse set of organization systems when compared to
infectious disease events. Within the field of public organization
theory, these non-infectious disease systems would be expected to
elicit a number of predictable challenges to effective communica-
tion and coordination [30,31]. With a more explicit recognition of
these complex systems, researchers and practitioners may be able
to better able to predict associated challenges, their consequences,
and strategies for avoiding critical failure points during urgent
events. Second, our study system profiles also provide an
indication of the frequency and circumstances with which
particular organizations might become involved in public health
response activities – information that is of the greatest importance
when developing and fostering relationships with potential
partners in the community. We found that some entities are likely
to take part in a public health response of any nature, including
public health agencies, healthcare providers, and members of the
general public, whereas many other organizations are either
infrequently involved in public health responses or typically have a
role only under specific event circumstances. The American Red
infectious disease events (top box), 100% of events involved epidemiology and surveillance (Activity A), and in 82% of events this activity was felt to
be essential. The activities are ordered by five functional domains: investigation, disease control and prevention, information and incident
management, surge management, and community resilience. Technological emergencies, complex events, and anticipated events are excluded from
this figure due to small sample size.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079457.g003
Figure 4. Public health response system profiles, by event type. Figure 4a shows the public health response system profile for each of six
different types of events, displayed as separate bar charts, key provided in Figure 4b. For a given event type, the green vertical bars show the
proportion of events that involved each of the 41 defined response partners. For example, within infectious disease events (top box), 98% of events
involved local public health agencies (Organization Type A). The types of organizations are ordered based on the overall frequency with which they
were mentioned, most frequent to least frequent, from left to right. A gray dotted line, at the 50% marker, is included in each bar chart to highlight
those organizations involved in more than half of events of that type.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079457.g004
Local Public Health Systems and Urgent Events
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 10 November 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 11 | e79457
Cross provides a good example of an organization that was almost
universally active in our severe weather and mass casualty events,
but rarely took part in infectious disease or bioterrorism events.
Furthermore, the partner agencies described in our study, with few
exceptions, lent their expertise or resources to a very limited
proportion to the overall public health response activities. One
interpretation of this finding is that only a fraction of response
efforts will be salient to those organizations. Alternatively, this
could suggest opportunities for expanded roles of organizations in
response efforts. Lastly, we found that the role of public health
varied tremendously by type of event. Public health departments
were ten times more likely to serve in a lead role for infectious
disease events compared to events involving severe weather.
Recognizing these response patterns can have an impact on
planning and exercising with partner agencies, particularly with
respect to setting expectations and developing a mutual under-
standing about the roles and responsibilities of public health
agencies in various situations, an issue that has repeatedly been
recognized as an area needing improvement [3,32].
When looking at health department characteristics, our findings
suggest an inverse correlation between the number of full-time
staff at a health department and the number of response
organizations and activities activated during an event, after
controlling for event type. While it might be expected that
organizations with greater capacity would require less outside
assistance, resulting in fewer organizations in the overall response
system, it is somewhat surprising that we also observe a similar
relationship with the number of response activities. One possible
explanation is that health departments with fewer staff are
required to work with a greater number of external organizations,
and as a result, those organizations engage in a broader set of
activities than a smaller response system.
Using conceptual models of response to improve
preparedness
Our study response profiles suggest a few predictable configu-
rations common to public health response efforts. For example,
while far from comprehensive or validated, our data identified
three conceptual models of response. In the first model of
response, most typical of infectious disease events, public health
agencies serve in the lead role to the overall response; response
activities and partners are more limited in number and type; the
number of cases define event severity; and the epidemiology and
surveillance function is considered most essential to the response.
In the second model of response, most typical of severe weather
and natural disasters, public health agencies serve in a joint or
supporting role to the overall response; response activities and
partners are more numerous and diverse; disruption to community
infrastructure defines event severity; and environmental health
and mass sheltering and care activities are considered most
essential to the response. In the last model of response, typical of
events involving chemical exposure or biological agents, public
health agencies serve in a joint or supporting role to the overall
response; response activities are moderate in number; response
systems involve atypical partners; number of persons exposed
defines event severity; and information and incident management
activities are considered most essential to the response. An
approach that uses ‘‘prototypical’’ models for response, such as
this, could provide the basis for a new avenue of planning that
builds on the strengths of those currently used. Like planning
based on single scenarios (e.g. aerosolized anthrax), response
models are grounded in concrete real-world incidents, making it
easier to conceptualize the likely functional and structural aspects
of a response. This allows for the development of detailed response
protocols, which can be used to guide the training of staff and
purchase of resources needed to test, implement, and improve
these plans [11]. At the same time, the conceptual models are
general enough that insights and skills gained from planning for
one threat can be expected to be applicable, although not
identical, to other hazards with a similar profile, increasing the
efficiency of planning.
Extension of CDC preparedness capabilities
We used a capabilities-based approach as an organizing
framework for conceptualizing public health response activities.
This planning model, based on an assumption that preparedness
can be achieved by directing resources towards building, testing,
and improving defined priority areas, is at the core of the CDC
‘‘preparedness capabilities’’ that were used to characterize the
response activities described by our informants. Consequently, our
results complement the PHEP Capabilities by highlighting the
circumstances in which related activities or functions might have
particular relevance in practice. Not surprisingly, our study finds
that certain types of events were much more likely to elicit
response activities related to particular capabilities, and that the
frequencies with which capability-related activities were performed
did not necessarily equate with how ‘‘essential’’ that capability was
to the overall event. For example, the epidemiology and
surveillance capability was almost universally activated. However,
it was more likely to be considered ‘‘essential’’ for certain types of
incidents, particularly infectious disease events. Linking our results
to the CDC PHEP Capabilities framework may be of particular
value to preparedness planners, for example, by guiding the
selection of exercise scenarios that would be most likely to trigger
activities related to the capabilities they seek to assess or improve.
In addition to the original PHEP Capabilities, we also asked
participants about four additional categories of activities that were
identified through our previous research and pilot testing as (1)
important and (2) of a different character than the PHEP
Capabilities. These activities included: environmental or product
investigation, consulting subject matter experts, assessing public
health or medical capacity, and evacuation. While each of these
proved to have relevance in certain contexts, environmental and
product investigations stand out because informants mentioned
these activities with such frequency, and considered these activities
as essential in more than one-third of infectious disease, chemical,
and severe weather incidents.
Currently, environmental investigations are folded into the
‘‘epidemiology and surveillance’’ capability; however, the resourc-
es, staffing, and partners required for these activities are quite
distinct from those required for epidemiology and surveillance. We
believe that under-specification of important response functions
can have serious consequences, particularly in an era of scarce
resources, in which health departments are often only able to
direct their efforts to a limited number of preparedness improve-
ments. Environmental investigations and other noted activities
might be considered in future versions of the PHEP Capabilities or
other discussions about what it means for communities to be
prepared. Our informants also identified a variety of ‘‘other’’
public health activities carried out in the response to their events,
that they felt were distinct from the PHEP Capabilities, and may
also merit further attention.
Given the current fiscal and political environment, which
increasingly demands accountability from the public sector, our
findings may prove to be particularly informative. In the absence
of strong empirical evidence, policy makers have relied on expert
opinion and a very limited research base to guide the development
of preparedness standards, guidance, and performance measures
Local Public Health Systems and Urgent Events
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[6]. Our research demonstrates that the available literature is not
representative of the urgent events that health departments face,
and that the available descriptions of the public health system in-
action do not reflect actual complexity. Our study strengthens this
limited evidence base and we hope increases accountability and
improves guidance, policy, and best practices in preparedness and
response.
Strengths
Our study benefits from three major strengths, including active
event finding, a broad definition of urgent events, and the use of
in-depth interviews as a data collection method. As a result, we
were able to gain access to a number and diversity of urgent events
that would not have otherwise been available. In fact, fewer than
ten percent of the events included in this investigation were
published in the peer-reviewed literature or other professional
information-sharing web portals, confirming that the publicly
available literature describes a very limited proportion of events
experienced by LHDs. For example, only two percent of events
were reported to the Department of Homeland Security’s Lesson
Learned and Information Sharing (LLIS) web portal database,
which is believed to contain a fairly comprehensive set of response
summaries.
Second, our study adopted of a broad definition of urgent
events, thereby expanding the available case material on public
health responses. By pooling data across incidents with different
contexts, we had a sufficient number to examine patterns,
highlight commonalities and differences across events with
different contexts, and generate hypotheses for future study.
Third, because this is a fairly new field of research, the use of in-
depth interviews for data collection was invaluable, as this method
provided participants the opportunity to ask for clarification on
questions and for interviewers to ask follow-up questions and to
hear how health department representatives describe their
response. These qualitative data, while not highlighted in our
findings, influenced the insights we drew from the data. This study
was also strengthened by the availability of organizational data,
provided by the 2010 Profile of LHDs, which provided a sampling
frame of local health departments, allowing us to better
understand the representativeness of our sample and interpret
our findings, and affording us the opportunity to examine how
characteristics of a health department influence our outcomes of
interest [18]. Finally, our approach also draws strength from the
application of a systems-based and functions-based approach, both
seen as essential features of high-quality research in this field [3].
By using the CDC PHEP Capabilities as a framework for
conceptualizing public health activities, we hope to be able to
contribute to the scientific literature in a way that is standardized,
and thus allows for comparison with future research.
Limitations and Next Steps
While our results describe the responses to a wide range of
incidents, our method of event-finding did not draw from a sample
that is statistically representative of all health departments or
urgent public health incidents across the United States. Repre-
sentativeness was not a cornerstone of our sampling goal; however,
in order to appropriately interpret the findings of this study, we
believe that it is important to recognize the ways in which our
findings are not representative. First, while we were able to achieve
the desired number of events for comparison, we had a fairly low
overall response rate (35%). Based on the reasons for not
participating provided by a subset of our non-participants, a
significant proportion of health departments in this group may not
have experienced an incident that met our study criteria.
Therefore, we believe that the true response rate of eligible LHDs
was considerably higher. Nonetheless, we recognize that partici-
pating agencies systematically differed from those who did not
participate: they were significantly more likely to serve a larger
population, have higher public health expenditures per capita, and
have more full-time staff. Non-participants health departments’
capacity or inclination to participate may be related to a specific
response profile that is underrepresented in our results. Second, we
allowed participants to select a single event, which is one of many
from which they could have potentially chosen. We do not claim
to know anything about the events that were not selected;
therefore, it is not possible to know how representative our set of
events really is. We do know that the distribution of event types in
our sample is similar to that found in other research [18].
Furthermore, certain types of events occur more frequently in our
dataset, such as norovirus outbreaks and hurricanes. As a result,
each event profile is disproportionately influenced by these more
frequent events. Lastly, health departments that served a
population of fewer than 50,000 individuals were excluded from
our sampling strategy. The response system attributes of these
health departments, which often have very limited staffing,
warrant additional study.
Another limitation of this study is that we recorded only
whether certain activities were initiated and which partners were
involved in a response. We did not attempt to characterize the
quality or appropriateness of those partners or activities. Addi-
tionally, we do not provide information on the organizational,
inter-personal, leadership, training, or historical factors that likely
influenced whether responding agencies considered response
measures to be appropriate and actionable.
Conclusion
In this study, we collect highly structured data on more than 120
real-world acute public health incidents. This is the first study to
systematically describe and analytically compare the response
operations of local health departments and their community
partners during such a large range of acute incidents. As a result,
we are able to make comparisons across events and to identify
functional and structural response patterns that have relevance to
public health practitioners and researchers. As an extension of this
work, we recommend that future studies examine the types of
events that were less commonly reported in our sample, including
mass casualty and chemical events, and suggest continued use of
standardized data gathering to ensure that future guidance, policy,
and research is grounded in the best evidence learned through
real-world events.
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